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Elaine Gibson* Wired Identities: Retention and Destruction
of Personal Health Information in an
Electronic World
This article examines the issue of the retention and destruction of personal
health information. While legislation in Canada shows some attention to the
issue of retaining health records, very little consideration has been given to their
destruction. As technological advances have made indefinite retention feasible,
serious privacy issues are now being raised by the lack of a standard related to
the destruction of health records. The author argues that this issue needs to be
explicitly addressed. The author analyzes this problem by looking at issues of
autonomy, public good, inequality, and privacy as a social good before offering
thoughts on the shape that policies around the destruction of personal health
information should take.
L'article examine les enjeux qui entourent la retention et la destruction de
renseignements personnels sur la sante. Alors qu'au Canada, les mesures
legislatives semblent porter une certaine attention a la retention des dossiers de
sante, la question de leur destruction nest que peu ou pas abordee. A mesure
que les progres technologiques ont rendu possible la retention des dossiers pour
des periodes indefinies, de grands problemes lies a la protection de la vie privee
sont aujourd'hui provoques par I'absence de normes concernant la destruction
des dossiers de sante. Lauteure affirme que ces problemes doivent 6tre abordes
de maniere explicite. Pour les analyser, elle examine les questions d'autonomie,
de bien public, dinegalite et de respect de la vie privee en tant que bien social
avant de reflechir sur la forme que pourraient prendre les politiques entourant la
destruction des dossiers de sante.
* Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University. I am grateful to have been selected as recipient
of the Charles D Gonthier Fellowship from the Canadian Institute for the Administration of Justice
and the Dr. Robert F Maudsley Memorial Research/Study Grant from the College of Physicians &
Surgeons of Nova Scotia. Financial support from these awards aided in the development of this paper.
I am also grateful for the excellent research assistance provided by Ilana Luther.
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Introduction









4. Privacy as a social good
Conclusion
In my view, self-identity is central to human existence .... The essence
of this discussion is that privacy mechanisms define the limits and
boundaries of the self. When the penneability of those boundaries is
under the control of a person, a sense of individuality develops. But it is
not the inclusion or exclusion of others that is vital to self-definition; it is
the ability to regulate contact when desired .... Thus privacy mechanisms
serve to help define me.'
Introduction
Our identities are to a significant degree both embedded in and shaped by
personal information concerning ourselves. Health information contains
arguably the most sensitive and intensely personal aspects of ourselves,
and thus is a fundamental aspect of identity. How we choose to be known
or not known, the health information we reveal or don't reveal based on
how we think others will identify or label us, and the ways in which we
reinvent ourselves over time are all powerful ways in which we control
aspects of our identity. The topic of retention has been addressed in
Canadian legislation and policies designed to ensure the protection of
personal health information. The flip side of retention-destruction-has
received little attention to date. Statutes and policies mention destruction
1. Irwin Altman, The Environment and Social Behavior: Privacy, Personal Space, Territory, and
Crowding (Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1975) at 50 [emphasis added].
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in passing, but the parameters of destruction and the reasons for requiring
it have not been supplied, and there has been a dearth of discussion at a
conceptual level in the academic literature. Yet the issue of destruction
of personal information is of vital importance to the ability to control the
shaping of our identity.
The world is changing dramatically as information shifts to electronic
form. The value of personal health information has increased significantly
in both monetary and non-monetary terms in recent decades. And with
the digitization of information, pragmatic aspects of indefinite retention
become solvable; indeed, we have entered an era in which it is more
expedient to retain than to destroy information. A number of arguments
favour indefinite retention for the benefit of us, our offspring, and future
society. However, it is the premise of this paper that, especially in light
of the shift to digitization, the need to protect privacy and confidentiality
requires a greater emphasis on destruction as an important aspect of the
safeguarding of personal health information. This in turn, I argue, is a
necessary ingredient in the preservation of identity.
The first part of this paper briefly outlines the need for and importance
of retention of personal health information, followed by examination of
the need for destruction. It then provides an overview of laws and policies
in Canada pertaining to the retention and destruction of personal health
information. The failure of legislation to adequately address the topic of
destruction of personal health information has not been of major import
over the years. However, the rapid and increasing digitization of this
information has profoundly altered the situation, creating a firestorm of
problems with privacy. This leads to the question of determining how this
problem should best be addressed. The following section analyzes the
topic in the contexts of autonomy, information as a public good, inequality,
and privacy as a social good. I then offer tentative proposed irections for
setting destruction policies.
The specific focus of this discussion is physicians and surgeons, but
suffice it to say that the various health professions have similarly vague
and differing provisions in their governing legislation as to retention
and destruction.2 Also note that the focus of this paper is personal
health information, that is, information that is identifiable or potentially
identifiable in combination with other information. Information that is
2. For example, pharmacists in Canada have retention requirements ranging from two years
(PharmacyAct, RSPEI 1988, c P-6.1, s29(a)) to 15 years (Regulations of the New Brunswick College
of Pharmacists, May 2014 (Queen's Printer, May 2014), s 17.22(1), online: New Brunswick College
of Pharmacists: <www.nbpharmacists.ca>), with no stated requirement in Nova Scotia.
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anonymized3  is not imbued with identical privacy concerns; however,
once information is truly anonymized, it loses much of its value.4 Genetic
information is within the scope of this paper due to the health information
inevitably contained therein. Genetic information presents a particular
conundrum in the context of anonymization in that it is unique to the
individual and therefore can never truly be anonymizedi Furthermore,
information considered to be anonymized can sometimes be de-anonymized
through electronic-information-savvy endeavours.' Finally, even if truly
anonymized, a remote yet discernable privacy interest subsists.7
I. Rationales for retention and destruction
The retention of personal health information is a positive undertaking for
individuals and for society in a number of ways. First, health professionals
have an ethical obligation toward their patients to hold their information
in trust for an extended period of time.8 This obligation attempts to ensure
that a historical record of one's health status, such as tests ordered and
treatments received, is available for the subsequent provision of care.9
Retention also enables review for purposes of billing, quality assurance,
3. See definition of anonymized information in Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research,
Tri-Council Policy Statement: Ethical Conduct for Research Involving Humans (Ottawa: Secretariat
on Responsible Conduct of Research, 2014) at 59, online: PRE <http://www.pre.ethics.gc.ca/pdf/eng/
tcps2-2014/TCPS 2 FINAL Web.pdf>: "Anonymized information-the information is irrevocably
stripped of direct identifiers, a code is not kept to allow future re-linkage, and risk of re-identification
of individuals from remaining indirect identifiers is low or very low."
4. Identifiable personal health information may be required, for instance, in order to fully understand
reasons behind certain patient behaviours: see William Crown, "Characteristics of the Marketplace for
Medical Care Data" in Claudia Grossmann et al, eds, Clinical Data as the Basic Staple of Health
Learning: Creating and Protecting a Public Good: Workshop Summary (Washington, DC: National
Academies Press, 2010) 143 at 147-149.
5. See Bahrad A Sokhansanj, "Beyond Protecting Genetic Privacy: Understanding Genetic
Discrimination through Its Disparate Impact on Racial Minorities" (2012) 2:2 Columbia J Race &
L 279 at 282-286; Amy L McGuire, "Identifiability of DNA Data: The Need for Consistent Federal
Policy" (2008) 8:10 American J Bioethics 75 at 75 [citations omitted]. McGuire explains:
DNA is itself uniquely identifiable. In 2004, Zhen Lin and colleagues illustrated that access
to just 30-80 statistically independent single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) was
sufficient to uniquely identify an individual. Recently, Homer and colleagues demonstrated
that an individual's SNP profile could potentially be identifiable even when it is aggregated
with 1,000 or more other samples.
6. Amitai Etzioni, "A Liberal Communitarian Conception of Privacy" (2012) 29:3 John Marshall J
Computer & Info L 419 at 459-460 [Etzioni, "Communitarian Conception of Privacy"].
7. Elaine Gibson, "Is There a Privacy Interest in Anonymized Personal Health Information?"
(2003) Health LJ 97. Sokhansanj elaborates on this topic, discussing how the use of even anonymized
information for research purposes can impact negatively on African Americans, see Sokhansanj, supra
note 5.
8. Mclnerney vMacDonald, [1992] 2 SCR 138 at 150-151, 93 DLR (4th) 415 [Mclnerney].
9. Lorne Elkin Rozovsky & Noela Joy Inions, Canadian Health Information: A Practical Legal
and Risk Management Guide, 3rd ed (Markham, ON: Butterworths, 2002) at 7.
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and regulation.°As well, records have become highly valuable to enable
the conduct of research and epidemiology or tracking of health and
disease.1" The information also may be required for purposes of litigation,
and a substantial period of time may elapse before an injury that may
be the cause of a lawsuit comes to light or the full extent of the injury
is revealed.2 Our present societal fascination with genetic and social
influences on our lives leads to claims of the need to know one's family
histories and influences, including the health status of family members.3
Also, there is archival significance in our health records. These significant
factors lean toward retention of information for as long as possible or in
perpetuity.
Reasons for retention are manifest and plentiful. The justifications in
favour of destruction are fewer in number but nevertheless mighty. I will
discuss two: cost and privacy. First, there is a cost to retaining information
in that it requires space-historically, with paper records, a great deal
of space. Second are issues of privacy and confidentiality.4 The longer
information is retained, the greater the likelihood that it will be accessed
by or disseminated to a range of individuals and organizations, and the
possibility that it will be inappropriately used multiplies. This gives rise to
acute privacy concerns. One's assessment of the relative value of privacy
implicitly informs one's view as to the nature and rigour of destruction
requirements.
Late in the 19th century, Warren and Brandeis published a foundational
piece on privacy law.15 They outlined what they viewed as then-modem
10. Elaine Gibson, "Health Information: Confidentiality and Access" in Jocelyn Downie, Timothy
Caulfield & Colleen M Flood, eds, Canadian Health Law and Policy, 4th ed (Markham, ON:
LexisNexis Canada, 2011) 253.
11. Don Willison, Elaine Gibson & Kim McGrail, "A Roadmap to Research Uses of Electronic
Health Information" in Colleen M Flood, ed, Data Data Everywhere: Access and Accountability?
(Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2011) 233.
12. John J Morris & Cynthia D Clarke, Law for Canadian Health Care Administrators, 2nd ed
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011) at 102.
13. See, e.g., Juliet R Guichon, Ian Mitchell & Michelle Giroux, eds, The Right to Know One
Origins: Assisted Human Reproduction and the Best Interests of Children (Brussels: Academic &
Scientific, 2012); Michelle Giroux & Mariana De Lorenzi, "'Putting the Child First': ANecessary Step
in the Recognition of the Right to Identity" (2011) 27:1 Can J Fam L 53; Vanessa Gruben & Daphne
Gilbert, "Donor Unknown: Assessing the Section 15 Rights of Donor-Conceived Offspring" (2011)
27:2 Can J Fam L 247.
14. For purposes of this discussion, privacy may be considered the entitlement of the individual
or group to keep aspects of themselves away from being exposed. Confidentiality is the obligation
of another to keep secret information that has been conveyed to him or her. These definitions are
elaborated on in Elaine Gibson, "Public Health Information Privacy and Confidentiality" in Tracey
M Bailey, Timothy Caulfield & Nola M Ries, eds, Public Health Law & Policy in Canada, 2nd ed
(Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2008) 91 at 92-93.
15. Samuel D Warren & Louis D Brandeis, "The Right to Privacy" (1890) 4:5 Harv L Rev 193 at
390 The Dalhousie Law Journal
incursions into one's private life. The incursions that were the subject of
concern included "instantaneous photographs," "numerous mechanical
devices," and the widespread circulation of newspapers, with the latter's
social gossip columns being seen as particularly egregious. In response,
they developed the concept of a nascent right to privacy, identified broadly
as the "right to be let alone."
Warren and Brandeis published their article in 1890. A somewhat
similar contemporary formulation is the newly-established "right o be
forgotten."16 The European Court of Justice earlier this year determined
that there is value in being able to choose not to have personal information
available to others in perpetuity."7
The ability to control the shaping of our identity in significant respects,
including the right to be let alone, the right to be forgotten, and other
significant aspects of the right to privacy and confidentiality, militates
against the indefinite retention of personal health information. Destruction
is the sole guaranteed method of preventing a breach of confidentiality.
II. Laws and policies
The federal government first enacted legislation with the aim of ensuring
the protection of information held by public institutions, and the provinces
followed suit. Private sector legislation has since been enacted at both the
federal and provincial levels, regulating either personal health information
specifically or personal information more broadly. The legislation
provides for the retention of information but, as we shall see, contains little
guidance on the need for destruction of health records. The remainder of
this discussion focusses on private sector legislation and policies.
In the year 2000, Parliament invoked the federal trade and commerce
power to enact the Personal Information Protection and Electronic
Documents Act (PIPEDA). " PIPEDA covers information used, collected,
or disclosed in the course of commercial activity. Industry Canada has
declared that physicians and surgeons in private practice fall under
the auspices of PIPEDA by virtue of their engagement in commercial
activity. 9 Hospitals, on the other hand, are presumptively excluded from
195.
16. Google Spain SL and Google Inc v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (AEPD) and
Mario Costeja Gonzalez, C-131/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, [2014] 3 CMLR 1247 [Google vAEPD].
17. Discussed further below in section on Privacy as a social good.
18. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 [PIPEDA].
19. Industry Canada, PIPEDA Awareness Raising Tools (PARTs) Initiative for the Health Sector:
Questions & Answers, (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 25 February 2013) at 1, online: Industry Canada
<https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/ecic-ceac.nsf/vwapj/PARTS QandA-e.pdf/$FILE/PARTS QandA-e.
pdf>. Commercial activity is defined as "any particular transaction, act or conduct or any regular
course of conduct that is of a commercial character, including the selling, bartering or leasing of donor,
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PIPEDA."°AII provinces have enacted legislation to regulate private sector
information, either health care-specific2 1 or private-sector more broadly.
22
PIPEDA permits provinces and territories to have their information
legislation declared substantially similar to PIPEDA, and in that
circumstance, that legislation takes the place of PIPEDA for information
which stays within the province.23 Legislation in Alberta, British Columbia,
Ontario, New Brunswick, and Newfoundland and Labrador has been
declared substantially similar.24 Where substantially similar, PIPEDA
applies only to information going into and out of the province and to
information collected, used or disclosed in connection with the operation
of a federal work, undertaking or business.
Schedule 1 Principle 5 of PIPEDA indicates that information is to be
retained only for so long as is necessary to fulfil the purposes for which
it was collected2 5 following which it is to be "destroyed, erased, or made
anonymous.' '26 Organizations are responsible for developing guidelines
and procedures for retention and destruction.2 Note that these provisions
within PIPEDA are ambiguous and contain no suggested time frames.
Instead of providing clear guidance in the legislation and regulations,
membership or other fundraising lists": PIPEDA, supra note 18, s 2(1).
20. Industry Canada, supra note 19 at 3.
21. Health care-specific legislation is as follows: Manitoba's Personal Health Information Act, SM
1997, c 51, CCSM c P33.5 [MB PHIA]; New Brunswick's Personal Health Information Privacy
andAccessAct, SNB 2009, c P-7.05 [NB PHIPAA]; Newfoundland and Labrador's Personal Health
Information Act, SNL 2008, c P-7.01 [NL PHIA]; Nova Scotia's Personal Health Information Act,
SNS 2010, c 41 [NS PHIA]; Ontario's Personal Health Information Protection Act, SO 2004, c 3,
Schedule A [ON PHIPA]; Prince Edward Island's Health Information Act, SPEI 2014, c 31 [PEI HA]
(not yet in force); Saskatchewan's Health Information ProtectionAct, SS 1999, c H-0.021 [SK HIPA].
22. Broad private sector legislation is as follows: British Columbia's Personal Information
Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63 [BC PIPA]; Quebec's An Act respecting the protection of personal
information in the private sector, CQLR c P-39.1 [QC PPIPS]. Alberta is unique in having broad
private sector legislation and health care-specific legislation: Alberta Personal Information Protection
Act, SA 2003, c P-6.5 [AB PIPA]; Alberta Health Information Act, RSA 2000, c H-5 [AB HIA].
23. PIPEDA, supra note 18, s 26(2)(b).
24. The following provinces have had their health information legislation declared substantially
similar: British Columbia (Organizations in the Province of British Columbia Exemption Order,
SOR/2004-220); Ontario (Health Information Custodians in the Province of Ontario Exemption
Order, SOR/2005-399); Quebec (Organizations in the Province of Quebec Exemption Order,
SOR/2003-374); New Brunswick (Personal Health Information Custodians in New Brunswick
Exemption Order, SOR/2011-265); Newfoundland and Labrador (Personal Health Information
Custodians in Newfoundland and Labrador Exemption Order, SI/2012-72). Alberta's general private
sector legislation has been declared substantially similar (Organizations in the Province ofAlberta
Exemption Order, SOR/2004-219), but its health-information-specific legislation has not (i.e., AB
HIA, supra note 22).
25. That is, unless there has been a request for personal information: see PIPEDA, supra note 18, s
8(8).
26. Ibid, Schedule 1, ss 5, 4.5.3.
27. Ibid, Schedule 1, ss 5, 4.1.4.
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decision-making as to how to operationalize the responsibilities of
retention and destruction is downloaded to individual organizations.
Provincial legislatures have adopted varying requirements and
approaches to retention and destruction. Most provincial information
legislation in Canada either authorizes the making of regulations
concerning retention28 or mandates that organizations are to develop
policies and implement procedures.9 Thus, similarly to under PIPEDA,
primary responsibility is shifted from the provincial government level to
the organizations themselves.
1. Retention
In addition to information legislation, each province has legislation
establishing a governing college for physicians and surgeons, and each
college has provisions requiring the retention of records. The basic time
period for mandated retention ranges from five years from the date of last
entry in Quebec,3" through six years in Saskatchewan,31 to ten years in
most provinces.32 British Columbia is the clear outlier, having increased
its requirements in 2014 from five to sixteen years.33 These periods are
increased for minors, for whom varying additional times are added for
retention, ranging from two years past the age of majority in Alberta
and Saskatchewan3 4 to sixteen years past the age of majority in British
Columbia.35 Quebec does not require additional retention for minors. The
28. ABHL4, supra note 22, s 108(1)(o); SKHIPA, supra note 21, s 63(1)(i); QC PPIPS, supra note
22, s 90. Note that such regulations have rarely been made.
29. ABPIPA, supranote22, s35;BCPIPA, supranote22, s35;MBPHL4, supranote21, s17(1);
ONPHIPA, supra note 21, s 10; NB PHIPAA, supra note 21, s 55(1); NSPHL4, supra note 21, s 50;
NLPHIA, supra note 21, s 13(2).
30. Reglement sur les dossiers, les lieux d'exercise et la cessation d'exercise d'un medecin CQLR c
M-9, r 20.3, s 12 [QC Regulation on Records].
31. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, Regulatory Bylaws (CPSS, April 2015),
s 23.1(f), online: CPSS <https://www.cps.sk.ca/Documents/Legislation/Legislation/Regulatory / 20
Bylaws%20O -o2OApril%/p202015.pdf>.
32. See, e.g., Ontario's General, 0 Reg 114/94, s 19(1); College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Prince Edward Island, "The Application of the Principles of Privacy" (CPSPEI, April 2004), online:
CPSPEI <cpspei.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Privacy-Principles-P-Apr-2004.pdf>; College of
Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia, "Policy on the Content and Maintenance of Medical Records"
(CPSNS, 18 October 2013), online: CPSNS <www.cpsns.ns.ca!DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/
Download.aspx?Portalld-0&Tabld 129&Entryld-42>.
33. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, Bylaws (CPSBC, 12 March 2015), s
3-6(2), online: CPSBC <https://www.cpsbc.ca/files/pdf/HPA-Bylaws.pdf>.
34. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta, "Administration of Practice: Patient Records"
(CPSA, 3 April 2014), s 9, online: CPSA <www.cpsa.ab.ca!Libmries/standards-of-practice/patient-
records.pdfsfvrsn-2>; College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, supra note 31.
35. College of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, supra note 33. This mandated
time frame far exceeds the Canadian Medical Protective Association (medical liability defence
organization)'s general recommendation of a minimum ten-year retention (plus ten years from age of
majority).
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rationale for this high degree of variance from province to province is
unclear, other than the fact that retention needs to at minimum mirror
limitation periods for bringing civil action, and these limitation periods also
differ between provinces. Note that these retention periods are identified
as minimums; by inference, unless there is a specified requirement for
destruction following the retention period, the information may be held for
a longer period of time.36
This variability and dearth of specificity in guidance may simply reflect
confusion, or it may reflect differing conceptions of privacy informing
the legislature or organization. The need for flexibility to accommodate
the extension of minimum retention periods is clearly and understandably
driven by the need for evidence in case of an eventual civil claim. However,
the fact that this extension is justifiable in certain circumstances does not
in turn justify a lack of specificity in the eventual need for destruction.
2. Destruction
Despite wide variation and ambiguity, at least the requirements for retention
are addressed in every jurisdiction, unlike those for destruction. Most of
the colleges of physicians and surgeons outline the required procedures if
the records are being destroyed.3 However, interms of whether destruction
is actually required in and of itself, the colleges' requirements vary widely.
The colleges of physicians and surgeons in Alberta38 and Saskatchewan39
have no provisions concerning destruction. New Brunswick," Ontario,4 1
and Quebec4 2 provide that information "may" be destroyed; there is no
requirement to do so. Manitoba's legislation43 refers physicians to the
36. The Canadian Medical Association (the primary national advocacy organization for physicians)
states that information should be retained "at least for the period required by the provincial or territorial
regulatory authority (College) or by any applicable legislation. It may be necessary to maintain
personal health information beyond the applicable period where there is a pending or anticipated legal
proceeding related to the care provided to the patient." See Canadian Medical Association, "CMA
Policy: Principles for the Protection of Patients' Personal Health Information" (CMA, 2011) at 4,
online: CMA <policybase.cma.ca/dbtw-wpd/Policypdf/PD 11-03.pdf>.
37. See, e.g., British Columbia bylaws under the Health ProfessionsAct, RSBC 1996, c 183, College
of Physicians and Surgeons of British Columbia, supra note 33, s 3-7(1), which outlines the methods
by which various types of records are to be destroyed.
38. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Alberta, supra note 34.
39. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Saskatchewan, supra note 31.
40. College of Physicians and Surgeons of New Brunswick, "Guidelines: The Patient Medical
Record" (CPSNB, June 2010), online: CPSNB <www.cpsnb.org/english/Guidelines/guidelines-7.
html>.
41. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, "Policy Statement #4-12: Medical Records"
(CPSO, May 2012), online: CPSO <www.cpso.on.caICPSO/media/uploadedfiles/policies/policies/
policyitems/medical records.pdf>.
42. QC Regulation on Records, supra note 30.
43. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Manitoba, By-law #I (CPSM, 1 December 2008), online:
CPSM <cpsm.mb.ca/cjj39alckF30a/wp-content/uploads/By-Law-1.pdf>.
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Manitoba Personal Health Information Act, which states: "A trustee shall
establish a written policy concerning the retention and destruction of
personal health information and shall comply with that policy."44 Thus,
Manitoban trustees of information are to develop their own policies.
The College in Prince Edward Island indicates that "[p]aper records
no longer needing to be maintained should be destroyed by burning or
shredding .... Electronic records are to be erased and physically destroyed."45
This provision could be interpreted either as requiring destruction or as
simply mandating that, if records are to be destroyed, one must follow the
stated methods.
Legislative provisions, bylaws, and policies in Nova Scotia, British
Columbia, and Newfoundland and Labrador contain the strongest and
least ambiguous requirements for destruction. The Nova Scotia College
policy discusses the method but not the need for destruction; however, it
also refers the reader to the province's Personal Health Information Act,46
which provides:
At the expiry of the relevant retention period, personal health information
that is no longer required to fulfil the purposes identified in the retention
schedule must be securely destroyed, erased or de-identified.41
The British Columbia Personal Information Protection Act states:
An organization must destroy its documents containing personal
infornation, or remove the means by which the personal information
can be associated with particular individuals, as soon as it is reasonable
to assume that
(a) the purpose for which that personal information was collected is no
longer being served by retention of the personal information, and
(b) retention is no longer necessary for legal or business purposes.48
And a bylaw under Newfoundland and Labrador's Medical Act is clear in
its requirement:
Following the applicable period of retention.., medical records which
are not required to be retained in accordance with this By-Law must
be destroyed in such a way that reconstruction of the record is not
reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances."
44. MB PHL4, supra note 21, s 17(1).
45. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Prince Edward Island, supra note 32.
46. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Nova Scotia, supra note 32.
47. NS PHL4, supra note 21 s 49(2).
48. BC PIPA, supra note 22, s 35(2).
49. College of Physicians and Surgeons of Newfoundland and Labrador, "By-Law 6:
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The Canadian Medical Association simply indicates that disposal
should be in a safe and secure manner; it does not address the need for
destruction.5" The Canadian Medical Protective Association advises its
members that "[o]nce the retention period has expired, records should be
destroyed in a manner that maintains confidentiality."51
As the preceding discussion illustrates, provisions in the various
provinces regarding destruction differ markedly. Only three provinces have
a clear and unambiguous provision that mandates destruction of records.
Others use language such as "should" or "may," leave responsibility to
organizations to develop a policy, or are completely silent as to the need
for destruction. The main guidance provided in most provinces is how
to destroy if destroying, and not whether destruction is required per se.
It is even less common that the legislation addresses when to destroy. It
may be concluded that legislative provisions and guidance by regulatory
bodies and advocacy organizations regarding the obligations of retention
and destruction of personal health information are problematically vague.
In the era in which most of the relevant legislation was being drafted,
the preoccupation was with retention. This was due to the fact that
organizations wished to get rid of personal information as soon as possible
due to space and weight limitations, and therefore destruction was not
remotely the primary focus. Rather, the emphasis was on insisting that
records be retained for a suitably lengthy period of time for the purposes
for which they had been collected.2 The need for and specifics as to how
to meet the obligation of destruction have not received sufficient attention
by legislators or regulatory authorities. The recent and ongoing shift to the
digitization of information presents a number of challenges to meeting the
obligations of retention and destruction that must be addressed.
3. Digitization
It has been suggested that relevant legislative provisions and policies
are deficient due to vagueness, inconsistency, and sheer lack of guidance
regarding the retention and destruction of health information. These
deficiencies increase in significance when information is rendered
electronic due to the enhanced value of the information itself and due
Medical Records" (CPSNL, 30 April 2012), s 29, online: CPSNL <www.cpsnl.ca/default.
asp?com-Bylaws&m-292&y-&id-9>.
50. Canadian Medical Association, supra note 36.
51. Canadian Medical Protective Association, "A Matter of Records: Retention and Transfer of
Clinical Records" (CMPA, June 2013), online: <https://www.cmpa-acpm.ca/en/web/guest/-/a-matter-
of-records-retention-and-transfer-of-clinical-records>.
52. Jean-Franqois Blanchette & Deborah G Johnson, "Data Retention and the Panoptic Society: The
Social Benefits of Forgetfulness" (2002) 18:1 Information Society 33 at 34.
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to the complexities in attempting to ensure destruction of digitized
information.
Historically, health information was collected and stored on paper
in manila folders in the context of health care delivery in order to ensure
quality patient care and for billing purposes. Paper charts had a range
of limitations, one of which was the volume of storage space required
to retain them. The sheer weight and volume of paper-based records
resulted in destruction being a necessary part of running a health-
care service. These records also had a form of built-in confidentiality
protection in that they were stored in what Nicolas Terry refers to as
"innumerable data silos, ' 53 presumably by virtue of the fact that files
needed to be kept in close physical proximity to the care provider or
other institution.
The storage of personal health information has been transformed
gradually from paper-based to electronic medical records (EMRs).4
Governments in Canada crave information as they grapple with
burgeoning health care expenditures. A primary mechanism for
controlling budgets is increasing efficiency by making decisions
based on solid evidence. This need for evidence results in strong and
intensifying demands for information for the purposes of research,
planning, and evaluation of health care services and systems.5 The
federal government has invested $2.1 billion since 2001 through
Canada Health Infoway56 to facilitate the development and adoption of
electronic health records in health care facilities, pharmacy networks,
and physicians' offices. A majority of physicians' offices in Canada
now use EMRs as part of their practice.5
This signals a shift in the very nature of health information. First,
vast quantities of information are being created and stored. Problems
53. Nicolas P Terry, "Legal Issues Related to Data Access, Pooling, and Use" in Grossmann et
al, supra note 4, 151 at 159.
54. The EMR has been defined by the Canadian Medical Association as an electronic version of
the paper record, which may be part of an office-based system or a broad integrated network. See
Canadian Medical Association, supra note 36 at 5.
55. Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, Building on Values: The Future of
Health Care in Canada (Saskatoon: Commission on the Future of Health Care in Canada, 2002);
see also, Elaine Gibson, "Jewel in the Crown? The Romanow Commission Proposal to Develop
a National Electronic Health Record System" (2003) 66:2 Sask L Rev 647.
56. Canada Health Infoway, "Summary Corporate Plan 2012-2013" (Canada Health Infoway,
31 January 2012) at 1, online: Canada Health Infoway <https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/
index.php/re sources/infoway -corporate/busines s-plans/doc download/80 -summary-corporate-
plan-2012-2013>.
57. Health Council of Canada, Progress Report 2013: Health Care Renewal in Canada
(Health Council of Canada, May 2013) at 13, online: Health Council of Canada <www.
healthcouncilcanada.ca>.
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with retention due to paper-based storage limitations are virtually absent. An
eight-gigabyte flash drive, for instance, can store 160,000 word-document-
type pages' worth of information.58 In the year 2000, storage costs had
dropped to approximately $0.01 per megabyte,59 which was 1/50,000th the
amount they had been in 1980. By 2008, eight years later, the cost had been
reduced to a mere $0.0001 per megabyte.6 Thus, the primary motivation
of the custodian of information to destroy information-the need to gain
space-has been greatly diminished. Theoretically, data can be retained
in perpetuity; as Bennett, Parsons, and Molnar note, in the present era, "it
is just easier to retain data than to get rid of it ."61 Indeed Viktor Mayer-
Sch6nberger posits that he very act of deciding whether to retain or delete
information has become more expensive than simply retaining it.
62
Second, information has transformed from something primarily or
exclusively for patient care to something of value for other purposes. The
electronic era has veritably exploded the possibilities for uses of personal
health information, ushering in a new currency in the information itself
The collection of information in databases, combined with the ability to
merge various databases, results in a range of possibilities for exploitation
of electronic information for secondary uses. To take one example, a
database of information concerning women who receive social assistance
may be matched with a database containing children's medical records in
order to examine whether children born to mothers on social assistance
have relatively poor health outcomes.63 In this way, the identities of these
women and children in society are powerfully shaped based on the findings
of the research. Another example is the purchase by pharmaceutical
corporations of information as to prescriptions issued to patients in order
to target marketing to particular physicians based on their prescribing
58. CFgear Blog, "How Much Data Can a USB Flash Drive Hold?" (5 April 2010), CFgearblog
(blog), online: <cfgearblog.blogspot.ca/2010/04/how-much-data-can-usb-flash-drive-hold 5.html>.
59. A megabyte can contain approximately 500 pages of double-spaced plain-text: Per Christensson,
"How Many Pages of Text Will One Megabyte Hold?" (3 July 2005), online: <pc.net/helpcenter/
answers/how much text in one megabyte>.
60. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 2009) at 63.
61. Colin J Bennett, Christopher Parsons & Adam Molnar, "Forgetting, Non-Forgetting and Quasi-
Forgetting in Social Networking: Canadian Policy and Corporate Practice" in Serge Gutwirth, Ronald
Leenes & Paul De Hert, eds, Reloading Data Protection: Multidisciplinary Insights and Contemporary
Challenges (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014) 41 at 41. For a more fulsome exploration of this topic, see
Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 60.
62. Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 60 at 68.
63. From 2002-2005 I served on the Family Benefits Database Advisory Committee, which
reviewed proposals to merge the family benefits database for Nova Scotia with other health-related
and socioeconomic-related atabases.
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patterns.64 These are just a few illustrations of this newfound currency in
health information.
EMRs may be compatible with and integrated into broader networks of
interoperable (i.e., regional or provincial) electronic health record (EHR)
systems. EHR systems have rich potential in that the information they
contain can be used to enhance the quality of patient care (for example,
multiple points of access to diagnosis and care information); also the
information may be mined for purposes of research,65 surveillance, audit,
planning, and evaluation of health care services and systems. As one
example of the actual dollar value of health information, the government
of Iceland sold access to its health sector database to a corporation called
deCODE. The contract provided for payments of between $950,000 and
$1,900,000 per year.66
Blanchette and Johnson analyzed the shift to electronic information
in the contexts of bankruptcy law, young offender records, and credit
reports. They identified primary reasons that American society, in their
view, is headed toward what they refer to as a "panoptic society."67
First, the quantity of data being collected has mushroomed. Indeed,
ScienceDaily reported in 2013 that 90 per cent of the world's data had
been generated in the previous two years,68 and one research group has
estimated a growth rate of approximately 30 per cent per year in the global
accumulation of information.69 Second, the granularity of the information
being collected has greatly increased, such that its value is significantly
64. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, "PIPEDA Case Summary #2001-14" (Ottawa:
Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, 2001), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of
Canada<https://www.priv.gc.ca/cf-dc/2001/cf-dc 010921 e.asp>.
65. See Patricia Kosseim & Megan Brady, "Policy by Procrastination: Secondary Use of Electronic
Health Records for Health Research Purposes" (2008) 2 McGill JL & H 5, for an explique of the
difficulties in providing access to EHRs to researchers in light of the approach taken by Canada Health
Infoway to their development.
66. See deCODE genetics, "Prospectus Registration File No 333-31984," online: NASDAQ <www.
nasdaq.com/markets/ipos/filing.ashx?filingid=1223935>. Due to a ruling of the Icelandic Supreme
Court on 27 November 2003, however, the company had to abandon its attempt to establish the Health
Sector Database after the Court found the company's attempt to establish the database unconstitutional.
See Icelandic Supreme Court, Ragnhildur Gudmundsdttir v The State of Iceland, No 151/2003,
online: <https://epic.org/privacy/genetic/iceland decisioapdf>.
67. Drawing on Jeremy Bentham's formulation of a system in which prisoners could be observed
constantly at little expense; Michel Foucault expanded from the prison context on the potential
application of the panopticon concept to society more broadly and used to wield power in Michael
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage Books, 1995).
68. See SINTEF, "Big Data, for Better or for Worse: 90% of the World's Data Generated
over Last Two Years," ScienceDaily (22 May 2013), online: <www.sciencedaily.com!
releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm>.
69. Peter Lyman & Hal R Varian, "How Much Information?" (2003) at 5, online: <groups.ischool.
berkeley.edu/archive/how-much-info-2003/printable report.pdf>, cited in Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra
note 60 at 52.
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enhanced. Third, the information can be aggregated with other databases
and types of information such that it provides "a much finer resolution of
the digital persona than each [piece of information] can by itself.7 When
these factors-quantity, granularity, and the ability to cross-correlate or
aggregate-are combined, there is high predictive power in the information
generated. Mayer-Sch6nberger would add to this list the assets of easy
retrieval71 and global accessibility.72 Blanchette and Johnson indicate that
there is much excitement about the potential for this information to be used
as an asset, and little concern at present as to the harmful effects that can
result from data retention3 -hence their prediction of a panoptic society.
Provincial governments in Canada hold a veritable cornucopia of
health information in comparison with most other jurisdictions due to
our publicly-funded health care system.74 The provinces have collected
and collated information for billing and other administrative purposes in
electronic format for at least forty years." Consider trying to garner parallel
information in a country like the U.S. with its widely disparate range of
health care providers in the private and public sectors. The implication is
that the personal health information held by provincial governments is rich
in value in comparison with the information available in most jurisdictions
outside of Canada.
EHRs can provide superior privacy protection in a number of respects,
including the ability to trace the identities of all employees within an
institution who have accessed a person's health records. However, there
are also heightened privacy risks associated with electronic information.
EHRs can be accessed from multiple points, conveyed virtually
instantaneously to many parts of the world, and carried on one's person
in a flash drive or hard drive. These factors render the information highly
amenable to sharing in various contexts. This, coupled with the fact that
millions of pieces of information can be combined, leads to the risk of
massive breaches of confidentiality compared with when information
existed only in paper files. As one egregious recent example, in July 2013,
the theft of four unencrypted computers at a U.S. facility compromised
the personal health information of over four million people." The fact that
70. Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 52 at 39.
71. Mayer-Sch6nberger, supra note 60 at 72.
72. Ibidat 79.
73. Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 52 at 39.
74. Willison, Gibson & McGrail, supra note 11 at 233.
75. Pat Martens, "How and Why Does It 'Work' at the Manitoba Centre for Health Policy? A Model
of Data Linkage, Interdisciplinary Research, and Scientist/User Interactions" in Flood, supra note 11,
137 at 137.
76. Advocate Health Care, Press Release, "Advocate Medical Group Notifies Patients, Offers
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information is stored in EHRs leads to a substantially heightened risk of
broad breaches of confidentiality.
Risks to privacy are further heightened by technical obstacles to the
destruction of EMRs. Depending on the software used, the information
often rests with a third-party vendor.77 This means that, unless covered
in a contract between the health care provider and the vendor, the health
care provider may lose control of how and for how long the data is to
be retained or destroyed. Also, EMRs must be backed up on a regular
basis, usually off-site .8 Consider a system that routinely backs up daily or
weekly-dozens or even hundreds of copies of the information may exist.
The federal Office of the Privacy Commissioner discussed this concept in
the context of online information:
Once personal information goes online, it may be difficult to delete.
While you may be able to delete it in one place, there may be cached
versions or copies stored elsewhere that you cannot control. Digital
storage is cheap and computer memory is plentiful. "And, unlike people,
the Net never forgets," Commissioner Stoddart says."
The physical ability to destroy the information is also problematic.
Deletion of the EMR does not actually destroy the data; it merely removes
it from the graphical user interface (essentially, the way we view the
information). A report produced jointly by Ann Cavoukian, then Privacy
Commissioner for Ontario, and the National Association for Information
Destruction, suggests the following as the sole proven methods for
destruction of electronic information:
The method of destruction for electronic media includes mechanical
destruction to render it unusable, degaussing, and sanitization (including
secure erase), and should involve removing all labels or markings that
indicate previous use. Simply deleting computer files or reformatting a
disk does not securely destroy the data because even deleted files may be
Protection Following Office Burglary" (26 August 2013), online: Advocate Health Care <www.
advocatehealtlicom/body full.cfm?id-12&action-detail&ref-293>. For a recent Canadian example
in which the personal health information of 620,000 Albertans was compromised, see "Laptop Stolen
with Health Information of 620,000 Albertans," CBC News (23 January 2014), online: <www.cbc.ca/
news/canada'edmonton/laptop-stolen-with-health-information-of-620-000-albertans- 1.2507161>.
77. Letter from Brad MacDonald (President, TimeAcct Information Systems) to Elaine Gibson (9
December 2014), on file with author.
78. Ibid.
79. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, News Release, "Protect your personal
information because the Internet never forgets, Privacy Commissioner of Canada says" (27 January
2011), online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/nr-
c/2011/nr-c 110127 e.asp>. Stoddart was presumably drawing for this concept on a piece by JD
Lasica: See JD Lasica, "The Net Never Forgets," Salon (25 November 1998), online: Salon <www.
salon.com/1998/11/25/feature 253/>.
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subject to data recovery efforts.
For all personal hand-held computing or processing devices (such
as PDAs and mobile phones) storing sensitive contact information,
calendars, documents, e-mail correspondence and other information,
methods of destruction may include mechanical destruction of the entire
unit, or destruction of the replaceable memory circuits or card so that the
device can be redeployed with a new memory component.8
A further challenge regarding destruction is that different records
on the drive will carry different time frames for retention, and so the
destruction dates will vary correspondingly. If the hard drive is destroyed
at the earliest date of expiry of an EMR's retention period, data that needs
to be retained will also be destroyed. If the hard drive is destroyed at the
latest date, other EMRs are defacto being retained too long.
The fact that more and more personal information is in the form of
EMRs does not alter the historical obligations of retention and destruction;
the obligations persist, but a physician who attempts to honour them is
greatly challenged by these developments.81 The risks associated with
EHRs are viewed as sufficiently high by the Canadian Medical Association
that it has taken the remarkable step of instructing physicians to advise
their patients that they cannot control access or guarantee confidentiality
of information once it is part of such a system.82
British Columbia's Privacy Commissioner, Elizabeth Denham,
referred to the need for greater privacy protections in the context of
developments in information technologies as follows:
The public expects there to be adequate safeguards to protect personal
information, both in the delivery of health care and research using health
data. Advances in information technology necessitate a much more
comprehensive approach to privacy and security risk management han
ever before.83
80. Ontario, Information and Privacy Commissioner & National Association for Information
Destruction, "Get Rid of It Securely to Keep It Private: Best Practices for the Secure Destruction of
Personal Health Information" (Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, October 2009) at 8,
online: IPC ON <https://www.ipc.oaca/images/Resources/naid.pdf>.
81. Nola M Ries & Geoff Moysa, "Legal Protections of Electronic Health Records: Issues of
Consent and Security" (2005) 14:1 Health L Rev 18.
82. See Canadian Medical Association, supra note 36 at 4.
83. Office of the Information and Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, "Investigation Report
F13-02, Ministry of Health," (OIPC BC, 26 June 2013), online: OIPC BC < https://www.oipc.bc.ca/
investigation-reports/1546>. This report resulted from the tragic suicide of a health researcher who
had been fired from his position in 2012 (along with six other government employees) based on the
claim that he had accessed personal data without proper authorization in the context of pharmaceutical
research: See "Roderick MacIsaac Suicide: B.C. Government Apologizes to Researcher's Family,"
CBC News (3 October 2014), online: <http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/roderick-
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Specifically, the need for destruction was addressed in a privacy impact
assessment conducted on the Canada Health Infoway (CHI) blueprint for
EHRs.84 The CHI blueprint had referred to a need for indefinite retention in
some cases. The impact assessment critiqued this suggestion on the basis
that it violated both the privacy principle of limiting retention and at times
Canadian laws. In response, CHI agreed to remove this statement from its
blueprint.85
Thus far, I have outlined the basic arguments for the competing forces
of retention and destruction and reviewed present laws and policies. I then
examined the move to digitization of personal health information, and
posited its creating a tremendous shift in the ability to retain information
indefinitely, as well as greatly enhancing the worth of the information
itself Privacy concerns are thereby heightened. In light of the need to
address destruction of information, the next section examines a range of
rationales that suggest different mechanisms for examining the topic.
III. Normative and public policy rationales
[I]n this debate [as to whether clinical data is a public good or private
property] the legal system is neither a spectator nor an independent actor.
Legal models enter the equation because they reflect and so perpetuate
the intended or perceived current state of public policy.6
This passage by Nicolas Terry indicates that laws follow and instantiate
public policy. If this is so, or if it is ia value worth striving for, it would be
important that our laws and policies be amended to reflect developments
in the area of health information. This takes us to the question of the
rationales to be applied to provide guidance.
Perhaps the most prominent line of debate in the area of health
information is between those who argue that autonomy of the individual
is foremost and requires respect for individual choice," and those who
argue that information is a collective asset and should be used for the
macisaac-suicide-b -c-government-apologizes-to -researcher-s-family- 1.2787048>.
84. Canada Health Infoway, A 'Conceptual' Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on Canada
Electronic Health Record Solution (EHRS) Blueprint Version 2 (Canada Health Infoway, 12 February
2008) at 29, online: Canada Health Infoway <https://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/en/componentl
edocmanlre sources/reports/privacy/ 13 -a-conceptual-privacy-impact-asses sment-of-the-ehrs-
blueprint-version-2>.
85. Ibidat 30.
86. Terry, supra note 53 at 152.
87. For a general discussion of privacy as control see Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York:
Atheneum, 1967); Louis Lusky, "Invasion of Privacy: A Clarification of Concepts" (1972) 72:4 Colum
L Rev 693; Charles Fried, "Privacy" (1968) 77:3 Yale LJ 475 at 493; Richard AWassertrom, "Privacy:
Some Arguments and Assumptions" in Ferdinand D Schoeman, ed, Philosophical Dimensions of
Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 317.
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public good." These viewpoints contrast sharply and do not leave much
room for common ground.89 Following an analysis of the limitations of
the individual choice/public good debate, I will briefly explore what an
equality-based analysis adds to an understanding of the value of privacy
in the context of personal health information. The final section analyzes
privacy as a public good and ends with some suggestions for reform.
1. Autonomy
A fundamental tenet of our legal system is respect for individual
autonomy. This respect is manifested in recent years in Canada primarily
in jurisprudence under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.9"
Based squarely in liberalism, it attempts to ensure that the individual is
able to exercise free will in choosing his or her destiny, and specifically
in having his or her privacy respected. The necessary implication is that
individuals should be able to control the use and retention of their personal
information to the greatest extent possible.91
One concept that might be considered part of a liberal framework is
that of data as property. Much of the American analysis of data revolves
around who owns-and who should own-the information.92 This frame of
reference implicitly sets up contesting claims on the part of the individual
who is the source of the information and others who claim an entitlement
to at minimum possess the information by virtue of its having been passed
on to them, or somehow surrendered, or through interpretation of the
relevant legislation. Viewing information through a property lens leads to
conceptualization of the ensuing rights as including the abilities to exclude
others from accessing it, to trade in such information, and to profit from
its use. Whoever is viewed as owning the information is conceived of as
having the ability to act autonomously with regard to it.
88. See, e.g., Don E Detmer & Elaine B Steen, "Shoring up Protection of Personal Health Data"
(1996) 12:4 Issues in Science & Technology 73.
89. Jeroen van den Hoven, "Information Technology, Privacy and the Protection of Personal Data"
in Jeroen van den Hoven & John Weckert, eds, Information Technology and Moral Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 301. See also "Healthcare Data: Public Good or
Private Property?" in Grossmann et al, supra note 4, 137.
90. Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms, s 7, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK),
1982, c 11. For examples, see R v Morgentaler, [1988] 1 SCR 30, 44 DLR (4th) 385; Rodriguez v
British Columbia (AG), [1993] 3 SCR 519, 107 DLR (4th) 342; Cuthbertson vRasouli, 2013 SCC 53,
[2013] 3 SCR 341. Note that the jurisprudence on autonomy is not exclusively Charter-based; see,
e.g., Malette v Shulman (1990), 72 OR (2d) 417, 67 DLR (4th) 321 (CA).
91. Mclnerney, supra note 8.
92. See, e.g., Paul M Schwartz, "Property, Privacy, and Personal Data" (2004) 117:7 Harv L Rev
2056; James B Rule, "Toward Strong Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms, and Institutions" (2004)
54:2 UTLJ 183; Thomas M Lenard & Paul H Rubin, "In Defense of Data: Information and the Costs
of Privacy" (2010) 2:1 Policy & Internet 149.
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Autonomy is of fundamental importance, but there are two basic
problems with its realization in the area of health information. First, the
information is inevitably conveyed to others in the course of seeking
health care services. Once this happens, the only mechanism that might
ensure respect for autonomy is if the individual consents to subsequent
uses. However, there is growing consensus that consent does not function
adequately for a range of reasons, including the following: it does not
apply when we are incompetent; it does not operate when it comes to
issues of public health, wherein societal needs take precedence; it cannot
include third-party information conveyed by an individual because
obtaining consent of the third party is impractical; and it is frequently
given under circumstances of duress or weakness.93 In addition to consent
not functioning adequately, a second problem is that we have little actual
control of our information in a number of significant ways. Legislation,
common law, and organizational policies grant custodians the opportunity
to engage in a wide range of uses without consent.94 In some circumstances,
93. See 0 O'Neill, "Some Limits of Informed Consent" (2003) 29:1 J Medical Ethics 4; Neil C
Manson & Onora O'Neill, Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007).
94. For example, Ontario's PHIPA, supra note 21, s 37(1) provides for the following permitted uses
without the requirement of consent:
A health information custodian may use personal health information about an individual,
(b) for a purpose for which this Act, another Act or an Act of Canada permits or requires
a person to disclose it to the custodian;
(c) for planning or delivering programs or services that the custodian provides or that
the custodian funds in whole or in part, allocating resources to any of them, evaluating or
monitoring any of them or detecting, monitoring or preventing fraud or any unauthorized
receipt of services or benefits related to any of them;
(d) for the purpose of risk management, error management or for the purpose of activities
to improve or maintain the quality of care or to improve or maintain the quality of any
related programs or services of the custodian;
(e) for educating agents to provide health care;
(f) in a manner consistent with Part II, for the purpose of disposing of the information or
modifying the information in order to conceal the identity of the individual;
(g) for the purpose of seeking the individual's consent, or the consent of the individual's
substitute decision-maker, when the personal health information used by the custodian for
this purpose is limited to the name and contact information of the individual and the name
and contact information of the substitute decision-maker, where applicable;
(h) for the purpose of a proceeding or contemplated proceeding in which the custodian or
the agent or former agent of the custodian is, or is expected to be, a party or witness, if the
information relates to or is a matter in issue in the proceeding or contemplated proceeding;
(i) for the purpose of obtaining payment or processing, monitoring, verifying or
reimbursing claims for payment for the provision of health care or related goods and
services;
0) for research conducted by the custodian, subject to subsection (3), unless another
clause of this subsection applies; or
(k) subject to the requirements and restrictions, if any, that are prescribed, if permitted or
required by law or by a treaty, agreement or arrangement made under an Act or an Act of
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the individual can explicitly opt out of its use, but the ability to do so is
infrequent. More importantly, the individual is generally neither aware of
the range of uses, nor of the ability to opt out.95 Therefore, the individual
does not control the uses of information in any meaningful sense.
Autonomy is important but in significant respects not actualisable,
and therefore is inadequate as a complete frame of reference for the
safeguarding of personal health information.
2. Public good
Health information is often argued as constituting a public good for two
principal reasons. First, there are major benefits in pooling information
and making it available for a range of uses.96 This argument conforms
closely to the spirit of communitarianism in that it prioritizes the public
good over the individual right with respect to the uses that should be made
of one's information.9" A second argument revolves around the fact that
health information is collected and rendered useful in electronic form by
virtue of government funding; thus, we all contribute to the health care
system by virtue of paying taxes, and therefore are entitled to reap the
benefits of the public use of information collected by the system.98 While
the latter argument has been made primarily in the American context, it
may be all the more salient in Canada given the universal coverage of
basic physician and hospital services through our health care system.
This model is not without its detractors. Amitai Etzioni, generally a
champion of communitarian values and approaches, posits that health care
information is exceptional in that it is the most highly personal and intimate
of all information, and also may be used to discriminate against individuals,
thus shaping their identities in problematic ways.9 9 He is particularly
concerned that the electronicization of information has given rise to maj or
and multiple breaches of confidentiality.10 Therefore, he argues in favour
Canada.
95. Jennifer Barrigar, Jacquelyn Burkell & Ian Kerr, "Let's Not Get Psyched Out of Privacy:
Reflections on Withdrawing Consent o the Collection, Use and Disclosure of Personal Informatiof'
(2006) 44:1 Can Bus LJ 54. The authors posit that consent is intended to be ongoing, and explore the
psychological reasons people are reluctant to withdraw consent. However, they do not discuss the
fundamental starting point that most are unaware of their ability to withdraw consent; unawareness of
the entitlement disenfranchises a person of the option to withdraw.
96. David Blumenthal, "Characteristics of a Public Good and How They Are Applied to Healthcare
Data" in Grossmann et al, supra note 4, 139.
97. Detmer & Steen, supra note 88 at 77-78.
98. Blumenthal, supra note 96 at 142-143.
99. Amitai Etzioni, The Spirit of Community: Rights, Responsibilities, and the Communitarian
Agenda (New York: Crown, 1993); Etzioni, "Communitarian Conception of Privacy," supra note 6 at
450-453.
100. Ibid.
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of enhanced privacy protections vis-a-vis health information in contrast o
other types of information.
Further, not all uses of information serve the public good. It is
questionable whether the public good is a generic and readily-definable
concept. For instance, who gets o decide whether something is in the public
good? Is it in the public good for a particular drug to be developed? Does it
matter if the pharmaceutical corporation stands to make a substantial profit
from it? Does it matter if their activities have violated the law?1"1
Neither the autonomy nor the communitarian/public good perspective
provides a complete answer. The individual choice/public good debate is
further problematized when viewed through an equality lens. The risks
of a violation of privacy may be heightened, and one's access to privacy
and confidentiality may be more limited, depending on one's status in
society. Privacy may be experienced differently by persons from disabled,
racialized, and otherwise socially and economically marginalized groups.
Any discussion as to solutions must include an analysis of the dynamic of
inequality.
3. Inequality
The sensitivity of personal health information varies with its nature
and context. For example, the fact that an individual is myopic may not
be experienced as sensitive by most, but if one seeks certain types of
employment, for example, with a police force, it may be highly sensitive
if it prevents entry to the profession. More importantly, the disclosure of
information that may not be of high sensitivity to an upper- or middle-
class individual can have a devastating impact if one lives in poverty-for
example, it may result in the intervention of child protective services.
Genetic information presents particular problems. Marsha Hanen
identifies the problematic impact of probabilistic genetic disease
predisposition in the contexts of employment and insurance, areas in which
knowledge of the predisposition can result in discriminatory treatment.
102
Karen Eltis examines the use of genetic predisposition research to draw
inaccurate, distorted, and stereotyped conclusions about members of
ethnic and racial minorities on the basis of intelligence.0 3
101. Erika Kelton, "More Drug Companies to Pay Billions for Fraud, Join the 'Dishonor Roll' after
Abbott Settlement," Forbes (10 May 2012), online: <www.forbes.com/sites/erikakelton/2012/05/10/
more-pharma-companies-to-j oin-the-dishonor-roll-pay-billions-for-fraud-following-abbotts-
settlement/>.
102. Marsha Hanen, "Genetic Technologies and Medicine: Privacy, Identity, and Informed Consent"
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One's access to privacy and confidentiality also depends upon one's
status in society. Catherine Frazee and her colleagues conducted a series of
focus groups with disabled women in Ontario to examine issues of privacy
and confidentiality when accessing health care services.1 14 They found that
in the experience of women with disabilities, confidentiality is routinely
denied in comparison with the able-bodied. They further explored the fact
that disabled women disproportionately receive social assistance and other
forms of government income support. These programs require the gathering
of health care information devoid of treatment of the individual-in other
words, the physician or other health care provider is in effect an agent
of the state, not of the patient. Women surveyed indicated that they feel
constantly scrutinized, even by their own physicians, and the confidential
nature of their relationship is seriously undermined when the physician
is required to report to government agencies. Thus, poverty, gender, and
disability intersect to deny these women-some of the most economically
disadvantaged members of Canadian society-the level of confidentiality
that those with greater privilege take for granted.
It may be seen that the collection, use, and disclosure of health
information has varying impact depending on one's position in society.
Those most disadvantaged have the least control over the shaping of
their identities and are most likely to experience adversely the effects
of inappropriate-or even legitimate-uses of their information. And,
as outlined above, the longer the information is retained, the greater the
potential that it will indeed be used in a way that impacts adversely on the
person or group.
4. Privacy as a social good
There is aline of argument that says: We need not set up this sharp dichotomy
between privacy on the one hand and social utility of information on the
other. Rather, we need to appreciate privacy itself as a public good-as
something that we as a society cherish. This theory does not take issue
with the communitarian conceptualization that information is a public
good, but posits that sprivacy is likewise a social good.105
The concept of privacy as a social good takes us into the nascent
area of emerging law being referred to as the "right to be forgotten." In
Rights Discourse to Better Comport with the Public Implications of Individual Genetic Testing"
(2007) 35:2 JL Med & Ethics 282.
104. Catherine Frazee et al, "The Legal Regulation and Construction of the Gendered Body and
of Disability in Canadian Health Law and Policy" (2011) National Network on Environments and
Women's Health Working Paper, online: SSRN <ssrn.com/abstract-1775204>.
105. Valerie Steeves, "Reclaiming the Social Value of Privacy" inKerr, Steeves & Lucock, supra note
102, 191.
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May 2014, the European Court of Justice ordered that Google remove
from its search engine information concerning an auction notice on the
complainant's repossessed home from many years prior.10 6 This has led
to a considerable range of views as to whether it is ever appropriate for
personal information to no longer be available.07
Blanchette and Johnson review the increasing trend to prioritize long-
term data retention over destruction in a number of domains.0 8 They argue
in favour of the social benefits of forgetfulness, of the ability for a person
to have a fresh start in life-in other words, to shape and reshape one's
identity over time. There is a benefit in being able to shed one's past that
is rendered impossible with long-term retention of data.
Mayer-Sch6nberger provides a stark example of the dangers in
collecting and retaining information in the Netherlands in the 1930s.1" 9
A citizen registry had been created in order to facilitate administrative
functioning and welfare planning. When the Germans invaded, they
confiscated the registry and were therefore able to identify citizens
classified by the Dutch government as Jewish or "Gypsy." This resulted
in much higher rates of targeting of these particular populations for
attempted eradication than in most other Nazi-controlled countries. Even
the Jewish refugee population in the Netherlands fared better than citizens
by virtue of the former's non-inclusion in the registry. What commenced
with benevolent intentions toward Dutch citizens-the creation of the
registry-later became a powerful malevolent force.
This example illustrates group harm caused by the retention of
information. A Canadian example of potential individual harm has led to
a decision to destroy vast quantities of personal information, including
much health information, in the context of Aboriginal residential
school survivors.1 Under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement
Agreement, an Independent Assessment Process (IAP) was established to
compensate survivors for abuse inflicted by the school system. The Truth
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was also founded to establish a
historical record of the treatment of Aboriginal children at church-run
residential schools and to ensure that this record is made available to the
Canadian public. In accordance with the IAP, compensation applicants
106. Google v AEPD, supra note 16.
107. See e.g., Jeffrey Rosen, "The Right to Be Forgotten" (2012) 64 Stan L Rev Online 88, online:
<www.stanfordlawreview.org>; Paul Bernal, "The EU, the US and Right to be Forgotten" in Gutwirth,
Leenes & De Hert, supra note 61, 61; Steven C Bennett, "'The Right to Be Forgotten': Reconciling
EU and US Perspectives" (2012) 30:1 BJIL 161.
108. Blanchette & Johnson, supra note 52.
109. Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 60 at 141.
110. Fontaine v Canada (AG), 2014 ONSC 4585, 122 OR (3d) 1 [Fontaine].
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provided documentation and oral evidence of the veracity of their claims.
Health information was a substantial component of this evidence. The
TRC sought to archive the evidence for posterity in a national research
centre:
For its part, the TRC submits that the IAP Documents are the single-
most comprehensive collection of documents that evidence the harms
suffered by residential school survivors. The TRC submits that the IAP
Documents contain a unique aggregation of items, which taken as a
whole provide the most comprehensive understanding of the abuses that
took place in the Indian Residential School system. The TRC and the
NCTR [National Centre for Truth and Reconciliation] submit that the
IAP Documents are essential to the creation of"as complete an historical
record as possible of the IRS system and legacy.""'
In contrast, lAP chief adjudicator Dan Shapiro argued on behalf of the
lAP in Ontario Superior Court that the archiving of these records would
breach the confidentiality of the survivors' information, which had been
provided for the purposes of claims adjudication, not for purposes of
the TRC. Justice Perell ruled in August 2014 that, subject to individual
consent, the records should be destroyed after a period of fifteen years
from the date of conclusion of the adjudication process.112 In the interim,
claimants are to be given the option of consenting to the retention and
archiving of their redacted records, failing which, their records are to be
destroyed.
This case serves as an interesting example on a number of levels.
First, it directly pits individual privacy against the perceived public good
in having the information available in perpetuity. Second, it engages a
question of equality in light of the concepts of group privacy and potential
group harms-is it better for Aboriginal groups to have the information
retained so that the best documentation of the devastating legacy of
the schools is readily available? Justice Perell answered this question
essentially in individual choice and consent terms as follows: it is up to the
individual claimants to make their own decisions in this regard by giving
their consent should they so choose-no one else can or should make
the decision for them. Third, it affirms the importance of forgetting-
the right of individuals to walk away from their past, to a limited extent,
overshadows the societal interest in retention of the information.
111. Ibid at para 238.
112. Ibid at para 362.
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Conclusion
A multi-faceted approach to the need for destruction is required. In the
first instance, it is important that we retain control over our information
to the greatest extent possible. This facilitates control of the shaping of
our respective identities. The decision on Aboriginal residential school
claimants was brilliant in this way-it gave control back to the claimants
to make their own choices. But in a multitude of ways we have already lost
control of decision-making surrounding our personal health information.
And in this electronic era it is unlikely that we will regain control. To
the extent that control is not possible, the analysis needs to go further.
A granular approach to retention eeds to be applied based on the type
of information, reason for collection, intended use or uses, and risks of
disclosure. There is no one-size-fits-all solution. For example, retention
in order to conduct public health surveillance or epidemiological research
has a high value to society, and so retaining the information for these
purposes would eserve a relatively high degree of tolerance as compared
to retaining information as a general default. One must also look to the
sensitivity of the information should inappropriate disclosure occur, as
well as the level of risk in the way that the information is stored-this
includes both the degree of identifiability and the security mechanisms in
place.
Destruction after a set period of time should be the default position.
At present, laws focus on retention time frames but a preferable system
would have set times for destruction unless a case can be made that
retention is in the longer-term interest. One arguing for the retention
of personal health information would need to show that its high social
value outweighs the privacy risks that accompany the data's retention.
Part of the assessment should focus on the potential impact on groups/
segments of society as well as on individuals.11 Rigid provisions for long-
term security of the information need to be in place, including succession
plans for organizations holding the data. Finally, there appears to be little
justification for the wide variation in laws at present. We need to develop a
national model framework which provincial jurisdictions can draw on for
guidance and adopt as appropriate.
Justice Windeyer of the High Court of Australia aptly referred to
"[f]aw, marching with medicine but in the rear and limping a little.""1 4 The
113. In this respect the judgment of Perell J in Fontaine, supra note 110 may arguably have been
deficient. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission had opposed destruction f the documents. The
judgment rested on individual choice while burying the inherent group interest in retention
114. Mount Isa Mines v Pusey [1970] HCA 60, 125 CLR 383 at 395, in the context of a claim for
psychiatric illness in negligence law.
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health professions have been embracing electronic technologies, but laws
have not kept up with the rapid pace of reform. It is time for this problem
to be addressed such that control over the shaping of our individual and
group identities is not swept away in the tide of our wired identities.

